Migration, mines and mores : the HIV epidemic in southern Africa by Hargrove, John




In a lecture given recently at the South African Centre for
Epidemiological Modelling and Analysis (SACEMA) in Stellen-
bosch, Brian Williams of the World Health Organization (WHO)
worried that, 30 years into the HIV/AIDS epidemic, we still do
not have a convincing explanation of why that epidemic is so
much more severe in some parts of the world than in others. He
noted: ‘Circumcision is thought to be important—but men in
North India are not generally circumcised. Promiscuity is
thought to be important—but Brazilians are not reticent about
sex, and people in West Africa have more sex but less HIV than
people in East Africa. Sex before marriage is common in both the
US and Europe—but those populations also have low rates of
HIV. Women’s empowerment is reckoned to be important—but
Islamic countries have almost no HIV.’
In illustrating the point, Williams showed a map of the distri-
bution of HIV in Africa. It was a map that took me back more
than 50 years to a schoolroom in Bulawayo in 1955 in what was
then Southern Rhodesia. In those days, we saw the world
through pink-tinted glasses. Almost everywhere we looked on
the map we saw the cheerful pink of colonial British Africa
(Fig. 1a): the Union of South Africa, Bechuanaland, South West
Africa, Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland,
Basutoland, Swaziland and, further north, Tanganyika, Kenya
and Uganda. Fifty years on, Britain has left and a lot of the
names have changed. But we still see bright pink all around us
(Fig. 1b), though now for less cheerful reasons. Today, we see the
map of southern Africa, coloured pink, because shades of pink
are used by the WHO and UNAIDS to denote levels of HIV infec-
tion, with the deepest shades reserved for those countries with
the highest prevalence, the most severe epidemics. And the
same eleven countries in southern and east Africa remain pink
because they have the dubious distinction of constituting eleven
of the top fifteen countries in the world in terms of the level at
which adult HIV prevalence, in urban centres, has peaked in
their individual epidemics.
The four other countries—Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi
and Ethiopia—are not ex-British colonies, but are also all in
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The seriousness of the HIV epidemic in southern and eastern Africa
has its roots in the 19th century—in the employment practices
instituted on mines, farms and in cities, where millions of men have,
ever since, lived apart from their families for the greater part of each
year. This destruction of the family unit was a sociological disaster
waiting for the arrival of HIV and is the source of many other social
ills—not least the increasingly violent nature of South African
society. In the short term we can promote HIV prevention measures
such as male circumcision and condom use. In the medium term,
we can hope that the many billions already spent on microbicide
and vaccine research begin to pay dividends. In the long term, we
need to change fundamentally the way that people live.
†This article is based on the author’s inaugural lecture delivered on 14 November 2007 at the
University of Stellenbosch.
Fig. 1. a, Map of sub-Saharan Africa by colonial power in 1955. b, Sub-Saharan Africa by distribution of peak HIV prevalence in urban areas, up to 2007. Source: UNAIDS
Fact Sheets.
southern or east Africa. Although the images in Fig. 1 are very
striking, and while former British colonies have an average peak
HIV prevalence level of 11% higher than the countries with a
different colonial past, peak prevalence seems to be more
strongly related to geographical region. A simple analysis of
variance between countries defined as being southern, east,
central or west African accounts for 66% of the variance in peak
HIV prevalence (Table 1). Countries of southern Africa have, on
average, a peak prevalence which is nearly 20% higher than in
the states of east Africa, and nearly 25% higher than in west and
central Africa.
I attempt in this article to shed some light on why the HIV
pandemic should be so particularly severe in southern Africa,
and then consider ideas about what we should try to do to rectify
this situation—in the short, medium and long term.
Others have carried out ecological analyses of the pan-African
distribution of HIV prevalence.1–4 It has been shown repeatedly,
for instance, that HIV prevalence declines significantly with the
proportion of males circumcised in a country. Indeed, much of
the recent analysis of the distribution of HIV prevalence in Africa
has centred on adjusting HIV prevalence for various other
possible risk factors, in order to demonstrate that having made
all of these adjustments, there is still a strong significant protec-
tive effect of male circumcision.
By itself, the proportion of males circumcised accounts for
about 66% of the variance in HIV prevalence for urban sites in 42
sub-Saharan African countries (Fig. 2).5,6 The situation is not nearly
as clear, however, when analysis is carried out on countries
within the different regions. Univariate analysis within three
African regions produces a significant relationship between HIV
prevalence and circumcision rates for east Africa only (Table 2).
By contrast, the proportion of Muslims in a country is a signifi-
cant factor in each region separately.
We should be clear, however, that the last two years have seen
the publication of results from three randomized control trials
on the effect of medical male circumcision on the acquisition of
HIV infection.7–9 All agreed in showing a significant protective
effect for men. Medical male circumcision in each case resulted
in at least a halving of the annual rate of new HIV infections.
Thus, while ecological studies of the distribution of HIV prevalence
in Africa may be open to criticism, the incidence studies provide
much more compelling and unequivocal evidence.
The protective effect of male circumcision against the trans-
mission of HIV infection from females to males is thus a less
contentious issue than it has been, and the results of the ecologi-
cal studies referred to above are therefore of less interest in this
regard. Indeed, given the results in Tables 1 and 2, there is a case
for standing the argument on its head. Instead of making
adjustments in efforts to demonstrate the protective effects of
male circumcision, we could rather adjust for male circumcision
and look at the residual variance due to other factors. As we will
see, what emerges from this analysis are strong residual regional
and religious effects, which suggest what may be the important
underlying determinants of the HIV epidemic.
Comparing HIV prevalence levels between countries
In analysing the distribution of HIV prevalence among countries,
it has been the practice to compare prevalences at a single point
in time.1–4 This may be justified on the grounds that standards of
HIV testing have changed, and have improved, over the years. It
is thus difficult to know how to compare, with time, prevalence
estimates from the same country. Regardless of the problems
associated with past estimates of HIV prevalence, however, it is
not valid to compare HIV prevalence between countries which
are at different stages of the epidemic.
A single example should suffice to make this point. HIV
prevalence in urban Uganda in the year 2000 was about 8%. In
Swaziland it was nearly five times this level, at 37%. But this
huge difference is entirely due to the timing of the analyses. If,
for example, the comparison had been made in 1992, the Swazi
HIV prevalence would have been only about 5%, and the
Uganda prevalence six times as high, at nearly 30%.
Given these considerations, it is clear that analysis of HIV prev-
alence data, and identification of risk factors using multi-
country data, should be carried out using data only from a simi-
lar stage of the epidemic in each country. It makes sense, in par-
ticular, to compare the peak levels of HIV. We obtained all
available antenatal clinic data on HIV prevalence in urban
settings from 42 sub-Saharan countries, and fitted the time
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Table 1. Analysis of variance of peak HIV prevalence by country in four regions of
sub-Saharan Africa; r 2 = 0.66.
Factor Coefficient (95% CI; P)
(Constant) 6.4 (2.4, 9.8; 0.002)
Region
West [Reference]
Central 2.6 (–4.1, 9.3; 0.44 )
East 8.7 (2.8, 14.7; 0.005)
Southern 26.5 (20.3, 32.7; <0.001)
CI, confidence interval.
Fig. 2. Peak HIV prevalence as a function of the proportion of men circumcised in
the countries of four different regions of sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 2. The relationship between peak HIV prevalence and the proportion of
Muslims and of males circumcised by country in various regions of sub-Saharan
Africa. With these units, for every 1% increase in the fraction that are Muslim (or
males that are circumcised) the prevalence decreases by 1% of the value of the
corresponding coefficient. In southern Africa, for example, the decrease would be
0.372% per unit increase in the proportion that are Muslim.
Fraction Muslim Fraction circumcised
Region Coefficient (95% CI; r2; P)
Univariate analyses
Southern –37.2 (–74.1, –0.4; 0.37; 0.048) – 8.6 (–55.5, 38.4; 0.03; 0.68)
East –31.3 (–46.3, –16.2; 0.71; 0.001) –29.2 (–42.8, –15.6; 0.72; 0.001)
Central/West –7.4 (–12.1, –2.7; 0.31; 0.003) –12.8 (–25.8, 0.1; 0.17; 0.052)
series of data using a double logistic function.5 We attempted to
ameliorate the comparability of these estimates over time, and
to reduce the effect of serious outliers in the data, by using for
analysis the smaller of the observed and predicted peak values of
prevalence.
Estimating the effects of male circumcision and religious
customs in the same model
HIV prevalence in 122 developing countries has in the past
been analysed separately for the effects of male circumcision
and religion, on the grounds that the percentage of males
circumcised was collinearly correlated with the proportion of
Muslims in a population.1 It was thus impossible to disentangle
the proportion of the protective effect accruing to male circumci-
sion from that attributable to other cultural norms particular to
the Muslim faith. The effects of religion and male circumcision
were separated in later work by examining HIV prevalence in
countries stratified on the basis of the proportion of Muslims
(or Christians) in the country.2 No quantitative measure was,
however, afforded of the protective effect of Muslim behavioural
norms other than male circumcision.
In another study a similar analysis noted that the impact of
circumcision on the AIDS rate was greater than the influence of
the Muslim variable, which included circumcision as well as
behavioural norms, apparently implying that no added protec-
tion accrues from Muslim behavioural norms.3 The following
argument shows that this is not the case.
We define: γm = fraction of Muslim males circumcised = 1; γn =
fraction of non-Muslim males circumcised; γm,n = overall fraction
of males circumcised; and µ = proportion of Muslims in the
population. We initially set up the model for HIV prevalence (π)
as the sum of the effects of the proportion that is Muslim, the
proportion of males circumcised, and the region:
π= a0 + a1µ + a2γm,n + a3(R), (1)
where a0 is the intercept in the regression model; a1 and a2 are
the coefficients giving the decrease in HIV prevalence per unit
increase in the percentage Muslim, and percentage of males
circumcised in the population, respectively; a3 gives the increase
in prevalence in a given region, relative to the region with the low-
est prevalence.
Note that for an entirely non-Muslim country (that is, when
µ = 0)):
π(0) = a0 + a2γn + a3(R), (2)
from which it is clear that a2 is the coefficient for the protective
effect of being circumcised. We assume implicitly that the protec-
tive effect of circumcision is the same for a Muslim as for a
non-Muslim man.
In a country which is entirely Muslim (that is, µ = 1 and γ = 1):
π(1) = a0 + a1 + a2 + a3(R), (3)
so that the difference in predicted peak prevalence between two
countries, one entirely Muslim and one entirely non-Muslim,
but where all males are circumcised (that is, where γn = 1) is
given by π(1) – π(0) = a1. Thus, the total protective effect of being
Muslim (as a result of being circumcised and of other cultural
factors) is given by a1 + a2.
Since the model in Equation (1) refers specifically to HIV
prevalence among the male population, we should ideally be
fitting the model to observed levels of HIV prevalence among
males. Reliable data on HIV prevalence among males are unfor-
tunately not available at levels sufficient to support a precise
analysis. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the peak HIV
prevalence among women in various countries will be highly
correlated with the peak prevalence among women in general,
and among pregnant women in particular. Accordingly, we
apply the above linear model to all available antenatal clinic HIV
data from 42 sub-Saharan African countries. Availability of reli-
able data has also suggested the use of data from urban settings
only in each country.
Results and interpretation of the multiple regression
analysis
All of the factors involved had highly significant effects on
peak HIV prevalence (Table 3), and the inclusion of just three
factors accounted for 85% of the variance in the data—despite
the inherent variability in, and uncertainty surrounding, the
HIV prevalence estimates, and the very simple model used to fit
the time series for each country.
Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has
been cited as playing an important part in determining the
variability in the prevalence of HIV in Africa.4 In 28 sub-Saharan
African countries, for which Gini coefficients were available,
peak prevalence of HIV was significantly associated with the
Gini coefficient by univariate analysis (R2 = 0.28, P = 0.004).
However, there were stronger associations with the percentage
of Muslims (R2 = 0.63, P < 0.001) and the proportion of circum-
cised males (R2 = 0.77, P < 0.001) in a country. In bivariate analy-
ses, using the Gini coefficient and either of these factors, the
coefficient was no longer significant (P > 0.1 in both analyses).
It is thus hard to argue convincingly on currently available
evidence for a causal link between a country’s HIV prevalence
and the degree of income inequality.
Interpretation of the analyses
The results are rather straightforward to interpret, when
applying Equation (1) to the results from Table 3. The protective
effect of being Muslim can be viewed, crudely speaking, as the
sum of protection due to male circumcision (a2 = 16.0), which we
assume applies equally to males of all religious persuasion,
and protection as a result of other effects (a1 = 9.3) associated
particularly with being Muslim. We should thus predict that an
entirely non-Muslim country, and one where no male is circum-
cised, would have a peak HIV prevalence of 16.0 + 9.3 = 25.3
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Table 3. Factors associated with peak HIV prevalence in various countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Multiple regression using Equation (1).
Univariate Multivariate
Factor Coefficient (95% CI; P) Coefficient (95% CI; P)
a0 Constant 24.2 ( 17.0, 31.4; <0.001)
a1 Proportion Muslim –23.9 (–33.6, –14.2; 0.006) –9.3 (–15.7, –2.9; 0.006)
a2 Proportion circumcised –35.4 (–42.1, –28.7; 0.001) –16.0 (–25.5, –6.6; 0.001)
Region
a3 West/Central [Reference] [Reference]
East 7.9 (2.4, –13.5; 0.006) 5.3 (0.9, 9.7; 0.020)
Southern 25.7 (19.9, –31.5; <0.001) 13.8 (7.5, 20.0; <0.001)
percentage points higher than a Muslim country where all males
are, by assumption, circumcised. Note that, as in an earlier
study,3 we also see in the univariate analysis (Table 3) that the
coefficient for the fraction of male population circumcised is
larger than that for the fraction of the population that is Muslim.
But, as we saw above from the multivariate analysis, this does
not mean that there is no added protective effect as a result of
being Muslim.
Figure 3 depicts the effects in graphic form, and also illustrates
the substantial regional differences in HIV prevalence, when
due allowance is made for the proportion of Muslims in the
population and of the fraction of men who are circumcised. For
the nine countries in the southern region, HIV has peaked at 13.8
percentage points higher than in west and central Africa and at
8.5 points higher than in east Africa.
To summarize, ecological studies in the past have tended to
concentrate on the importance of male circumcision in reducing
the risk of HIV infection. There has been a tendency to try to
explain regional differences in HIV prevalence rates in terms of
male circumcision rates, inferring that countries in southern
Africa which have lower rates of male circumcision than in west
Africa also have much higher HIV prevalence as a consequence.
The message from Table 3 is rather different. What we see from
this analysis is that even when we adjust for male circumcision
rates, and indeed for the proportion of Muslims in various
countries, we still find that HIV prevalence in southern Africa is
much higher than in the rest, particularly the west, of Africa.
What the analysis also indicates is that even after adjustment
for male circumcision rates, the protective effect of being Muslim
is nearly 60% of that due to male circumcision and does not differ
significantly from it.
These two results raise the obvious question: Is there some
common factor that we can see, which might simultaneously
explain why the risk of HIV infection is so much lower in Muslim
communities and so much higher among all countries in southern
and, to a lesser extent, east Africa?
Many factors are considered in the ecological studies as possible
risk factors for HIV infection and, at least in univariate analyses,
many statistically significant effects have been found—population
density; female literacy; poverty; skewed wealth distribution;
the proportion of young people in a country; human development
index; sexual behaviour patterns such as divorce and polygamy;
fertility rates and age at first intercourse; co-infection with other
sexually transmitted diseases and tuberculosis; and a large
number of variables related to health and health services, immu-
nisation rates, the numbers of doctors in a country, and various
measures of sexual behaviour.1,2
But, by multivariate modelling, the only factors among those
listed above that had statistically significant effects were: i) the
proportion of young people in the population, positively corre-
lated with HIV prevalence; ii) immunisation rates, female literacy
levels, and numbers of doctors per head of population—which
all correlated negatively with prevalence. None of these factors
seems to fit the requirement of being simultaneously responsible
for particularly raised HIV prevalence in southern Africa and the
reverse in predominantly Muslim countries.
Other factors of potential importance have, however, been
ignored in the cited analyses. In a seldom quoted paper in 1991,
David Sanders and Abdulrahman Sambo argued that the mi-
grant system of labour in southern and east Africa contributes to
family separation and the spread of disease (including AIDS),
from urban to rural areas as well as in the opposite direction.11
There is no consideration in the aforementioned ecological
studies of such effects. This is not entirely surprising, since data
on relative levels of family coherence and of urban/rural move-
ments are difficult to quantify and to compare among African
countries. On the other hand, family coherence seems to be a
feature that is very strong in Muslim culture, and one that has
also been particularly severely compromised in southern Africa.
Bearing this in mind, the results encapsulated in Table 3, to wit,
family structure, and factors which impact on that structure,
may provide important keys to an understanding of the distri-
bution of HIV infection in Africa. It is therefore worth consider-
ing some details of the historical development of southern
African society, the consequent effects on family structure, and
how these may be related to the HIV pandemic.
Rhodes not roads
When considering family separation and migration in southern
Africa the word ‘apartheid’ perhaps comes to mind—apartheid
is a favourite whipping boy in discussions of the roots of all
evil in southern Africa in general, and for the HIV epidemic in
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Fig. 3. Peak prevalence as a function of the proportion of Muslims in a country, predicted for various levels of circumcision of non-Muslim males, in two regions of
sub-Saharan Africa. Predicted values are approximations only. Thus, predicted levels of zero (and negative) prevalence for proportion of Muslims close to unity simply
reflect the joint effects of data variability and violations of the assumptions inherent in the linear model.
particular.12 There can be no doubt that apartheid contributed
greatly to the breakdown and fragmentation of social and family
life in South Africa, but I think that the problems have much
older and somewhat different origins, as I shall now explain.
When one thinks of the role that the movement of people has
played in the spread of HIV, there was in the past, and sometimes
still is, a tendency to demonize truck drivers.13 Parallels were
drawn between good road systems and the rapid spread of the
virus via commercial sex workers at truck stops. Roads and road
transport undoubtedly played a role, but the analysis above
identifies a quite different villain: it’s not roads that we should
be thinking of, but Rhodes, Cecil John Rhodes. It was Rhodes,
Alfred Beit and their mining associates, aided and abetted by
Lord Alfred Milner, who sowed the seeds of the southern African
HIV epidemic—and many other problems that are essentially
sociological in their origin and nature. Let me elaborate.
Following the defeat of British forces at Majuba in 1884, Paul
Kruger, as president of the Transvaal Republic, signed, under
duress, the Convention of London, which gave the Transvaal
independence in all matters except control over its foreign
affairs. What neither side was to know was that gold would be
discovered in the heart of this quasi-independent territory just
two years later. There was gold in unprecedented quantities, and
it was gold which Kruger’s volk were not then in a position to
mine and exploit fully for themselves. What then developed is
well known. I note only that, according to one analysis, it was
essentially Milner’s efforts, assisted particularly by funding
from Beit, that heaped unbearable diplomatic, and then military,
pressure on Kruger—making demands that Milner prayed that
Kruger would reject.14 Ultimately, the pressure told on Kruger,
who appeared to have been persuaded by Jan Smuts that, if it
had to be war, then the Transvaal should strike first. The
Transvaal sent the British an ultimatum and, when it expired,
they invaded Natal. Milner’s prayers had been answered—
though the less-than-edifying period in British colonial history
that followed was perhaps not quite what Milner had in mind.
For Milner, and Rhodes, the battle had always been about
‘Empire’; but the real impetus behind the battle in South Africa
was the gold. Putting aside the rights and wrongs of the Anglo-
Boer war, the subsequent explosive expansion of the goldfields
led to massive development in South Africa, and further finance
for commercial expansion into the neighbouring territories,
funded in large part by people such as Rhodes and Beit.
It wasn’t just the material wealth that Rhodes and company
needed from the neighbouring countries. There was a major
problem with the gold on the Rand. The geologists quickly
found that most of the gold was deep underground, embedded
as tiny speckles in huge volumes of hard quartz matrix (only 10 g
of gold in 1 tonne of ore). The deeper the gold, the more expen-
sive it was to mine. All costs had to be kept to a minimum; and
labour costs, in particular, had to be cut to the bone, especially
because the demand for labour was huge. As a consequence, the
South African mines needed manpower from neighbouring
countries. And I do mean ‘man’; women were almost entirely
excluded. There could be no question of having black families
living on the Rand; only the males could do the heavy work
underground, so only men would be housed.
And housed they were; hundreds of thousands of men at any
one time all over the Transvaal, and then the Orange Free State.
Not just from South Africa, but from Southern Rhodesia,
Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Mozambique, South West
Africa, Swaziland and Basutoland. Over the years companies
such as WENELA (the Witwatersrand Native Labour Associa-
tion) brought millions of healthy, strong and virile young men
for a stint on the mines. Their wives and womenfolk were at
home all over southern Africa; they saw each other once a year.
In between times, well, I don’t have to tell you what strong, virile
young men are wont to do—particularly when they have rather
more money than their peers, in general, and young women in
particular. And what of their wives and girlfriends left at home
for months at a time? It was a catastrophe waiting for something
like HIV to come along.
We should not single out only the mines, and certainly not
just the South African mines, as the sole villain of the piece. The
British tried to use forced labour in Uganda, and later recruited
Rwandans and Malawians to work there on the coffee and tea
estates.11 And the principle of having only males living and
working on mines, as well as on farms and plantations—and
even as domestic workers in big cities—became the norm all over
British southern and, to an extent, eastern Africa. The pattern was
more or less similar everywhere, from the Cape through the
Rhodesias, Tanganyika and to the ‘White Highlands’ of Kenya.
In cities in Southern Rhodesia, until well into the 1960s, it was
illegal for a (white) employer to allow his (black) manservant to
have his wife living on the premises with him.
The epidemiological consequences of oscillatory
migration patterns
What became entrenched was a system where men typically
lived and worked in cities or on large estates. They returned,
perhaps only once or twice a year, to their wives and families,
who typically had to maintain a foothold in the countryside,
farming a small piece of land, with little support.
While there is little, if any, direct evidence to link this system of
oscillating migration and the resulting damage to family structure
to its epidemiological consequences, we can offer some indirect
evidence. Using a diffusion model for the spread of an infection
like HIV, it is easy to demonstrate the intuitively obvious fact that
even high levels of sexual activity, and partner change, lead to
surprisingly low rates of epidemic expansion—as long as all of
this sexual activity is also strictly localized. An African version of
Peyton Place, or Desperate Housewives, if you prefer, leads to very
high rates of HIV infection—but the focus of infection is highly
localized. While concurrent relationships may well be important
requisite conditions for building an epidemic, they are not suffi-
cient.15 What we also need is that the partners, concurrent or not,
are geographically separated.
Modelling shows that the spread of the epidemic is spectacu-
larly different if even 10% of a person’s sexual activity is directed
in a geographically distant location. This model, which mimics
the essential features of oscillating migration, also suggests why
such migration is an essential component for an epidemic to be
as severe as the one we now witness in southern Africa.
There are indications, even within the southern African HIV
epidemiological epicentre, that those who have the strongest
family structures and psychosocial support systems are also least
likely to acquire HIV infection. Thus, multivariate analysis of
HIV prevalence data from the ZVITAMBO Project in Harare,
Zimbabwe (Table 4), shows that women who are HIV-infected
are more likely to be unmarried than HIV-negative women.
Moreover, they will not have completed secondary school
education, they will rent or live with extended family rather than
own their home, be unemployed, have a husband with fewer
years of schooling and a non-professional occupation, have an
extremely low family income, and no religious affiliation.16
Low income per se is less important than other factors, being
associated only with increased HIV-1 prevalence among women
with the lowest 3% of incomes. In short, what seems to be impor-
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tant is the strong ‘psychosocial support’ typical of a settled
family lifestyle.
The long-term solution
The preceding analysis strongly supports the concept that the
HIV pandemic in this part of the world has its roots in structural
deficiencies—and not in the inherently aberrant sexual behaviour
wrongly attributed to African populations.11 The paper by
Sanders and Sambo,11 published in 1991, was remarkable in that
the HIV prevalence rates at that time in the urban areas of
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa were ‘only’ 8%,
5%, 2% and 4%, respectively. How much more powerfully can
the point about structural deficiencies be made today, when the
prevalence levels are six to 15 times higher in these southern
African countries.5 Sanders and Sambo did not explicitly predict
the tsunami of HIV that was about to overwhelm South Africa
and its immediate neighbours south of the Limpopo. Given that
they identified so accurately the structural deficiencies of
self-evident importance in the development of the epidemic, the
prediction was almost inescapable for those countries that have
been the most severely affected by the oscillating migration asso-
ciated with the mines, farms and cities of southern Africa.
The unavoidable conclusion must be that we need urgently to
address the issue of how we can rebuild family structures in
southern and eastern Africa. Without such change, we may
confidently predict extreme difficulty in dealing effectively not
only with the HIV epidemic, but also with many other problems
having similar sociological determinants.
Changing HIV prevalence and incidence in Zimbabwe
One must conclude that sociological improvement will be slow
in coming, given the extreme difficulty involved in changing
society’s habits and traditions, particularly the employment
practices that have been entrenched for more than a century—
and practices that are implicitly so beneficial for big business
(regardless of the language spoken by the bosses or the colour of
their skins). The essential structural elements that predispose
southern Africa to disastrous levels of HIV infection and other
social ills are therefore likely to remain largely intact for the fore-
seeable future. Faced with this reality, can there be any ray of
light, any glimmer of hope, in what is now the epicentre of the
pandemic? Curiously, I think there is, even within the very heart
of darkness. Despite all the economic, social and legal shambles,
and the human-rights abuses that characterize Robert Mugabe’s
Zimbabwe,17 we see the curious fact that HIV prevalence among
women attending antenatal clinics (ANCs) in Harare has been
declining at nearly 10% per annum since about 1998 (Fig. 4).18
Moreover, basic epidemiological principles suggest that HIV
incidence—that is, the rate of occurrence of new infections—
started to decline in 1994. Mathematical modelling suggests that
these declines could not be attributed solely to the direct effects
of increased deaths among HIV-positive individuals, but have
been associated with declines in HIV incidence and changes in
sexual behaviour.19
The model, fitted to Zimbabwean ANC data for 2000–2004,
suggests that risky sexual behaviour has halved since 2000,
though the authors do not suggest why, or how, such behaviour
change might have arisen.19 It appears from more extensive
Harare ANC data, however, that HIV prevalence among younger
(less than 24-year-old) women has actually been declining since
1994. Since the vast majority of the HIV-positive members of this
age group must have been infected relatively recently, this sug-
gests that the decline in incidence, and reduction in risky
behaviour, started as early as 1994.
This is not to diminish the importance of death in the changing
face of the HIV epidemic. HIV incidence will decline as a natural
direct consequence of the early attrition of that class of society
exhibiting the riskiest sexual behaviour. If there is no accompa-
nying change in human behaviour, however, the incidence soon
levels off and equilibrium is established when the death rate
matches the rate of occurrence of new infections, and the HIV
prevalence is then maintained at a high level.
But death can also have an indirect effect on HIV prevalence, if
human beings react to the manifest effects of the HIV epidemic
by changing their behaviour. And the evidence of massively
increased death rates in the recent past is all too obvious in
Harare. An area of 150 hectares, just south of Harare, that was
bush just ten years ago, is now a massive cemetery, with tens of
thousands of closely-packed graves.
Mathematical modelling shows that it is possible to produce a
good fit to the HIV prevalence, in Fig. 4, under the assumption
that the rate of occurrence of new infections decreases as the
observed death rate increases. The best fit of the model to the
HIV incidence, prevalence and mortality data suggests, more-
over, that the death rate should have peaked in about 2001/2, as
indeed appears to be the case from the records of deaths in
Harare. The fit is thus consistent with the feasible contention
that people have modified their behaviour according to the
death rate at any given time. The particular mathematical
assumption that incidence declines exponentially with death
rate does, however, come with the consequence that reductions
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Table 4. Regression analyses of risk factors for prevalent HIV infection among
postpartum women enrolled in the ZVITAMBO trial in Zimbabwe (adjusted for date
of recruitment, age and parity).
Variable n Odds ratio
(95% confidence interval)
Marital status Married 13 198 1
Single 638 1.36 (1.13, 1.63)
Divorced 174 1.54 (1.13, 2.11)
Widowed 100 3.97 (2.53, 6.23)
Mother’s religion Non-Catholic 10 643 1
Catholic 2 709 1.19 (1.09, 1.31)
None 705 1.31 (1.11, 1.55)
Mother’s education Secondary 11 515 1
<Secondary 2 542 1.58 (0.99, 2.53)
Father’s education Secondary 12 701 1
<Secondary 1 356 2.27 (1.25, 4.13)
Father’s occupation Profession 2 306 1
Other 11 751 1.22 (1.10, 1.35)
Mother’s housing Own 1 464 1
Other 12 593 0.43 (0.24, 0.77)
Family income ≥18 10 332 1
(US$/month) <18 357 1.45 (1.16, 1.82)
Unknown 3 378 1.18 (1.08, 1.29)
Fig. 4. Estimated (dots, squares and triangles) and fitted (curves) HIV incidence
(– – –), prevalence (–––), and deaths (- - -) among women attending antenatal and
maternity clinic in Harare, Zimbabwe. Data from ref. 18.
in risky behaviour lead to declines in the death rate—and thus,
by our model, may lead to eventual increases in risky sexual
behaviour. The predicted incidence, prevalence and death rates
thus level off, instead of continuing to decline steadily (Fig. 4).
The model does not, in other words, attribute any ‘memory’ or
‘learning behaviour’ to the individuals modelled. Levels of risky
behaviour simply increase or decrease mechanically as a simple
inverse function of the death rate.
It is to be hoped—and this is my expectation—that this is an
unduly misanthropic view of humankind, and that people will
actually be (even) more thoughtful in their response to the
observed effects of HIV than suggested by our model.
Conversely, many would view my perception as an unrealisti-
cally optimistic view of the world. Indeed, even the suggestion
that HIV incidence has been declining in Harare, and that
this must be due to changes in behaviour, has met with great
scepticism from some scientists. One is left with the feeling that
they find it hard to believe that people are capable of altering
their sexual behaviour—except perhaps through enlightened
government policy, or via the insightful intervention by a gener-
ously funded international organization.
Judith Todd is more optimistic about human behaviour.17 She
notes that Zimbabweans overwhelmingly rejected Ian Smith’s
offer of a political settlement in 1972, brokered by the British
government via the Pearce Commission. Similarly in 2000, they
overwhelmingly rejected Robert Mugabe’s offer of a new consti-
tution, which brought promise of free farm land. The leadership
in both cases drew the conclusion that the electorate was politi-
cally naïve and easily led astray by the unscrupulous; black na-
tionalists in the first instance, white farmers in the second. Todd,
who has been cruelly persecuted under both Smith’s and
Mugabe’s governments, drew a quite different conclusion. She
argues that, in both cases, the people accurately detected evil
intent, and rejected it.
Perhaps that same basic human intelligence, rather than the
efforts of governments and aid agencies, is the most important
factor underlying the decline in HIV prevalence seen not only in
Harare, but also in Uganda and increasingly in other countries in
the region.19 Perhaps governments and aid agencies find this pill
so hard to swallow, because it devalues their contribution. None-
theless, if true, what the message implies is that the most impor-
tant role of the scientist remains exactly as it should be—the
objective and accurate observation, analysis, and dissemination
of information.
The developing HIV epidemic in South Africa
This more optimistic view might appear at first sight to find
little support from the observed trend of the HIV epidemic in
South Africa—where, by 2006, there was still no evidence of the
beginnings of the rapid decline in HIV prevalence that was
observed in Harare (Fig. 5), despite the abundant and direct
evidence everywhere in South Africa of the effects of HIV infec-
tion. It is true that HIV prevalence for 2006 was marginally
(though not significantly) lower than for 2005 and estimates
from the ASSA model suggest that HIV incidence has started to
decline.20 It is also true (Fig. 5) that the epidemic in South Africa
lags the Zimbabwean epidemic by about eight years, so that it is
possible (though not in the least guaranteed) that we might be
about to witness a similarly sharp decline in HIV prevalence in
South Africa.
The present levels of HIV infection everywhere in southern
Africa are nonetheless entirely unacceptable. Even in Zimbabwe,
where HIV prevalence appears to have been declining rapidly
for at least six years, the last published estimates of HIV
prevalence in Harare ANCs was still about 20% (Fig. 4)—hardly
a healthy situation. Much the same can be said of other southern
African countries, and we need to ask what, if anything, we can
do to influence this situation in a positive manner.
One small snip for man
There is evidence in some instances of HIV prevalence and
incidence declining as a consequence of behavioural change.
This has sometimes been attributed to direct governmental
action—as was argued when the Thai government pressured
female sex workers to use condoms with their clients.21 Similarly,
declining HIV prevalence in Uganda during the 1990s has been
attributed to ‘population mobilization’, which involved the
efforts of central government and civil society.22 The importance
of external intervention, other than education regarding the
nature and dangers of HIV, is unclear. The declines in HIV
incidence and prevalence in Zimbabwe, for instance (Fig. 4),
have been of a similar order to those observed in Uganda—but
have not been linked to intervention on the scale attributed to
the governments of Uganda or Thailand. This area continues to
be a matter of debate.
What is not a matter of debate is that there is currently little by
way of alternative options in the drive to reduce HIV incidence.
Whereas very large sums of money continue to be invested in
the development of HIV vaccines, and of microbicides that could
be used to block infection biochemically, the sad truth is that
there is no pharmaceutical product of any kind that is currently
effective in reducing HIV incidence. Organizations centrally
involved in the production of such medication are of the opinion
that we are years away from delivering even a partially effective
vaccine or microbicide.23
In the absence of viable pharmaceutical protection, the recent
publication of the results of three randomized control trials
demonstrating a more-than-50% protective effect of male
circumcision on female-to-male transmission of HIV (see
references above) is important. Mathematical modelling
suggests that a full-scale roll-out of male circumcision in
sub-Saharan Africa could avert 2.0 (95% CI 1–3.8) million new
HIV infections and 0.3 (95% CI 0.2–0.5) million deaths over the
next ten years. A further 3.7 (95% CI 1.9–7.5) million new HIV
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Fig. 5. HIV prevalence among women attending antenatal and maternity clinics in
Harare, Zimbabwe,18 and South Africa (UNAIDS Epidemiology Fact Sheets, 2006).
infections and 2.7 (95% CI 1.5–5.3) million deaths could similarly
be averted, over the ten years thereafter.
This modelling involved contributions from several of my
associates at SACEMA. The centre has from its inception taken
an active interest in the development of male circumcision as
an intervention, and continues to support Bertran Auvert, for
example, in his development of both the theoretical and practical
aspects of the work.
The success of the intervention, as modelled above, depends
of course on the assumption that the natural reduction in the
probability of female-to-male transmission of HIV in circum-
cised men is not offset by increases in risky behaviour, tending to
reduce, nullify or even over-compensate for the protective
effect. The only way to find out is to move towards a more
general roll-out of male circumcision as an intervention method
and, crucially, to keep track of the circumcised men to compare
their HIV incidence relative to men in the general population.
SACEMA fully supports the idea of expanding the application
of medical male circumcision in South Africa, as a natural
follow-up to randomized control trials. Such operational
research will allow further assessment of the challenges associ-
ated with applying the procedure on larger scales, while provid-
ing the necessary time to assess the longer-term protective
effects.
Further evidence of the protective effects of medical male
circumcision would inevitably influence cultural leaders of
non-circumcising ethnic groups to reassess their attitudes to
the practice. Moreover, even among groups that do habitually
circumcise their males, it may lead to a reassessment of the
timing and means of male circumcision. It has been noted that
the absence of clear differences in HIV prevalence rates between
South African ethnic groups who do, and do not, circumcise
their males may be related to the manner in which the circumci-
sion is carried out. Medical observers note that traditional male
circumcision can remove variable amounts of the foreskin and
that, therefore, the protective effect of traditional male circumci-
sion against HIV infection may be less than optimal.
If the observed ongoing results of increased frequency of
medical male circumcision are sufficiently encouraging, the
medical fraternity may need to start asking questions about
whether they should be advising parents of all ethnic groups to
have their sons medically circumcised at birth as a matter of
course. To the objection that this flies in the face of long-standing
cultural values, one may counter quite simply that cultures do,
and should, change: and there is no better reason to change than
in the interests of survival. Regardless of the changes which do,
or do not, occur with regard to future male circumcision
practices, what is of paramount importance is that all male
circumcisions should be carried out with the utmost regard to
safety for the patient.
Antiretroviral therapy as an offensive weapon
The above discussion of methods available for reducing HIV
incidence and prevalence has centred on prevention of infec-
tion. With double-digit HIV prevalence levels throughout
southern Africa, however, we have massive numbers of people
who are already infected with the virus. There has, quite rightly,
been increasing pressure over the years to improve access to
antiretroviral therapy—with the main emphasis on the improved
survival and quality of life of the patient, consistent with consid-
erations of delaying treatment so as to lessen the time spent on
drugs that can have unpleasant side effects and simultaneously
reducing costs and the chances of developing resistance. These
arguments are used to justify the standard practice in Africa of
starting antiretroviral therapy (ART) only when the CD4 count
drops to 200/µl,25 or when an HIV-positive patient presents with
symptoms typical of a WHO stage 3 or 4 infection.
There are several problems with this approach:
i) As a patient’s CD4 count declines, the probability of acquir-
ing opportunistic infections increases. In particular, by the
time the count approaches 200/µl, many will already have
tuberculosis, which has to be treated before ART can
commence.
ii) Even if the patient has not acquired TB, if the CD4 count is
below 200/µl at the onset of ART, this count does not fully
recover in some patients. While the mean CD4 count
increases, the increase in the mode is less impressive, and a
proportion of patients have CD4 counts that remain below
200/µl.
iii) Even after three years on ART, the probability of infection
with TB is several times higher than in HIV-negative people.
iv) These results are consistent with the view that prolonged
infection with HIV leads to accelerated senescence of the
immune system.24
While none of these lines of evidence may be compelling
alone, collectively they do constitute an argument in favour of a
markedly earlier administration of antiretroviral therapy—in
the interests of the individual HIV-positive patient. And there is
a further important epidemiological reason for wanting to start
earlier therapy. Analysis of data from one study in the Western
Cape province has shown that whereas the roll-out was reaching
seven times the national average, in terms of the proportion of
patients on ART among those who qualify, the HIV-positive
patients who were not receiving ART were predominantly
under 30 years of age. This is entirely natural, as the youngest
people tend, by definition, to have been HIV positive for the
shortest time, and fewer have CD4 counts below 200/µl than
in older age groups. On the other hand, the young are the most
sexually active age group, and thus the most important target for
any programme that aims to reduce transmission rates. Earlier
onset of ART would have the important and natural epidemio-
logical effect of reducing the viral load in larger numbers of sexu-
ally active patients and would thereby automatically reduce the
probability of this group infecting their sexual partners. It seems,
therefore, that there is a convergence of the individual and
population interests in the early recruitment of HIV-positive
patients into ART programmes.
If modelling indicates that the aggressive use of ART in this
way could be of service in reducing HIV incidence, there may be
a further argument for a more active approach towards the
identification of HIV-positive cases, such that major reductions
in viral load can be effected in the greatest proportion of
HIV-positive people. While political considerations currently
prevent general compulsory HIV testing, it is interesting to note
that Botswana has already adopted an ‘opt out’ approach to HIV
testing. That is to say, anybody visiting a clinic can automatically
be given an HIV test—unless they specifically ask not to be
tested.
Conclusion
I have discussed various possible measures aimed at address-
ing the immediate problem of reducing HIV incidence in South
Africa: earlier roll-out of antiretroviral therapy, coupled with a
more aggressive approach to case detection and promotion, and
proactive promotion of male circumcision. Any such intervention
will have to be combined with education programmes explain-
ing the reasons for male circumcision and especially the fact that
it gives partial but not complete protection, so that the use of
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condoms is still vigorously promoted. The roll-out of ART will
have to be combined with education and counselling, especially
in regard to protecting one’s partner and future children, but
may also serve as a way of encouraging people to come forward
for testing. These interventions will need very substantial
commitment and financial resources, and much of the responsi-
bility for this will fall on the shoulders of government. There will
undoubtedly be debate about the wisdom of these approaches
but, even if they are as successful as we hope they will be, one
needs to be mindful of the fact that they essentially amount to
the management of an immediate crisis.
None of these interventions—nor previous efforts to encourage
abstinence, fidelity or condom use—addresses the fundamental
social problems which have ensured that the HIV epidemic is so
severe in southern Africa. Indeed, AIDS in southern Africa
should be seen not only as a disease but also as a symptom of
social ills, in general, and of the fragmentation and breakdown
of family life in particular. If the analysis presented here has any
validity at all, what it implies is that until we manage to address
the underlying problem of the breakdown of family structures
in the region—and in South Africa in particular—we must
expect that our populations will continue to be prey to HIV, and
to any new sexually transmitted infection that arises.
Nor is the problem restricted simply to sexually transmitted
infections. South Africa currently has one of the highest rates of
violent crime in the world. There are, annually, twice as many
murders in Cape Town as there are in the whole of England and
Wales. One can point a finger at inadequate policing, corruption
and a general lack of political will in combating crime. But it is
tempting to suggest that the high crime levels and the high
incidence of HIV infection have the same structural source—the
breakdown of family structure associated with oscillatory
migration.
In combating HIV/AIDS there is, of course, a continuing imper-
ative for scientific innovation, for education and mobilization
involving religious, community and political leadership, and
for increased efforts in providing treatment for those already
infected. But the underlying cause of the HIV epidemic, and of
many of our social ills, has its roots in policies set in motion more
than a century ago. The present South African government is not
responsible for those policies. It is, however, in the unenviable
position of having inherited the responsibility for the conse-
quences—and therefore needs to mobilize all appropriate help
in addressing the underlying cause of the HIV epidemic in this
country.
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